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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in a rare ruling, held in
1
Laska v. Anoka County that a day care helper owes a duty to protect
2
an infant in day care from foreseeable harm. Infant Hannah Laska
died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) in a licensed day
care staffed by the provider and her adult daughter, who had
volunteered to help because her mother was caring for more
3
children than her license allowed. When an adult offers to help
take care of the children in an overcrowded licensed day care, a
parent would think the law would recognize that person owes a
duty to care for those children. However, the district court in Laska

† Cynthia R. Bartell is a partner at Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P. J.D., William
Mitchell College of Law, 1994; B.A. History and Humanities, Mankato State
University. Heather H. Neubauer is an associate at Foley & Mansfield, P.L.L.P.
J.D., William Mitchell College of Law, 2002; B.A. Political Science, College of St.
Benedict. Ms. Bartell represented Katherine I. Laska throughout the district court
proceedings. Ms. Bartell and Ms. Neubauer represented Ms. Laska in her appeal
to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
1. 696 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev. denied, (Minn. Aug. 16, 2005).
2. Id. at 139-41.
3. Id. at 136-37.

1549

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 7
12BARTELL-NEUBAUER.DOC

1550

5/31/2006 1:17:32 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4
4

found no such duty was owed under Minnesota law.
The district court’s ruling was not surprising. Minnesota
courts have been cautious in imposing a duty to protect on
5
businesses for public policy reasons. The issue of whether a duty
to protect another person is owed typically arises in two kinds of
cases: (1) when the plaintiff is the victim of a crime on the premises
6
of a business or property owner, and (2) when a vulnerable person
is in the custody of another and is deprived of the opportunity for
7
self-protection. Laska falls in the latter category of cases, in which
the courts may find a duty to protect arises if there is a special
8
relationship between the parties. In holding that the day care
helper in Laska owed no duty to protect Hannah, the district court
relied on a Minnesota Supreme Court holding that a landlord owes
9
no duty to protect a tenant from being murdered.
Whether a duty to protect is owed is ultimately a matter of
10
public policy. By reversing the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the day care helper in Laska, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals demonstrated yet again the value Minnesota courts place
11
on protecting vulnerable infants and children.
This Article reviews the prior cases in Minnesota in which the
appellate courts have considered whether a duty to protect was

4. Order and Memorandum, Laska v. Anoka County, No. C1-03-8400, at 3
(10th Dist. Ct. Minn. July 6, 2004).
5. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989).
6. See id. at 169-70.
7. See Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1999).
8. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (citing Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 130-31; Harper
v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993)).
9. Order and Memorandum, supra note 4 (relying on Funchess v. Cecil
Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001) (holding landlord not liable for
tenant’s murder because the landlord-tenant relationship did not create a special
relationship)).
10. See Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 673; Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169.
11. See Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (citing Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836,
842 (Minn. 1986) (“[S]mall children in a licensed day care facility are a particular
protected class.”)); see also Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 799
(Minn. 2005) (holding county who had received reports of suspected abuse of a
child owed a special duty to protect the child under the Child Abuse Reporting
Act), overruling Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 1996)
(holding there was no cause of action against a county under the Vulnerable
Adults Reporting Act for failing to protect a vulnerable adult from financial
abuse). As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in Radke, “[o]ur holding . . .
conforms with the majority of other jurisdictions recognizing a duty on the part of
social service agencies to investigate reports of child abuse and neglect.” 694
N.W.2d at 798.
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12

owed, and analyzes how the court of appeals came to the
13
conclusion that a duty should be recognized in Laska, despite the
Minnesota courts’ reluctance in the past to find a duty to protect.
II. THE HISTORY AND CASES LEADING TO LASKA
Minnesota courts hold, as a general rule, that there is no duty
to protect another from harm caused by third persons, with narrow
exceptions recognized in cases involving innkeepers, common
carriers, those who possess land that is open to the public, and
those who have custody of another person who is deprived of the
14
opportunity of self-protection. In those instances, the courts find
a duty may be owed based on the “special relationship” between the
15
parties. The following is a review of the cases leading up to Laska,
in which the Minnesota appellate courts have applied the general
rule and its exceptions. As set out below, in only three cases prior
to Laska did the courts hold that a duty was owed.
Twenty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in
Andrade v. Ellefson that a county was in a special relationship with
16
the children in a licensed day care giving rise to a duty to protect.
In Andrade, two seven-month-old boys suffered head injuries at the
17
licensed day care facility.
The county had received several
complaints from a neighbor about overcrowding at the day care,
18
but the county did little to investigate those complaints.
The
injured infants’ parents sued Anoka County, alleging the county
was negligent in conducting licensing inspections, supervising, and
19
investigating complaints about the licensed day care facility.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Andrade recognized that
ordinarily a county does not owe a common law duty to prevent a
third person from injuring another unless there is a “special
20
relation.”
Moreover, liability may not be imposed on a
municipality for negligence in performing its “many functions in
which the government protects the general public” unless the
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)).
15. Id.
16. 391 N.W.2d at 841.
17. Id. at 837.
18. Id. at 839.
19. Id. at 837-38.
20. Id. at 841.
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21

municipality owed the plaintiff a “special duty.” To determine
whether the county in Andrade owed a duty to the infants in the day
care different than the duty it owed the public in general, the court
22
applied its analysis in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court stated the decisive factor giving rise to a
special duty in Andrade was the statutes and regulations governing
day care licensing, which the court held were enacted to protect
23
the “uniquely vulnerable” children in licensed day care facilities.
[The Public Welfare Licensing Act] clearly mandates that
small children in a licensed day care facility are a
particular protected class. The class consists of uniquely
vulnerable persons: small children, often infants, left by
their working parents in a home other than their own,
and left in the care of another person for some period of
24
less than 24 hours of the day.
The supreme court concluded the “statutory mandate to
protect a certain class . . . [was] so overwhelmingly dominant that
we have no difficulty in finding a ‘special relation’ exists between
the county and the small children in the day care homes that it
25
inspects for licensure.” The court found that the operation of
child day care facilities presents “a high risk of liability exposure,”
26
which in turn “underscores the need for adequate inspection.”
21. Id.
22. 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979). The supreme court in Cracraft applied a
four-part test to determine if a municipality “assumes a special duty owed to
certain members of the public” that is distinguishable from the “many functions in
which the government protects the general public.” Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841.
Factors the court considers include: “(1) actual knowledge by the municipality of
the dangerous condition, (2) reasonable reliance on specific representations of
the municipality, (3) a statutory duty for municipal protection of a particular class,
and (4) municipal action which increases the risk of harm.” Id. (citing Cracraft,
279 N.W.2d at 806-07).
23. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 842.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 843.
26. Id. Justice Rosalie Wahl, concurring specially, put it this way:
The rules governing the licensing of family day care homes are detailed
and comprehensive . . . . When a county licenses a child care facility, it
represents to parents that these demanding standards have been met.
This is not a general representation, but a representation that this
specific licensee is a suitable person to have charge of children and that
this particular facility provides adequate care and surroundings for young
children . . . . Licensing standards are of critical importance to parents
seeking adequate, nurturing child care and parents rely on enforcement
of these rules. Parents who require child care have a special need to rely
on the representation of quality indicated by licensing . . . . There is no
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Based on its finding of a special relationship between the county
and the children in licensed day care facilities, the court held the
27
county owed a special duty to the plaintiffs in Andrade.
The Minnesota Supreme Court next held a duty to protect
28
arose in 1989 in Erickson v. Curtis Investment Co. In Erickson, the
plaintiff, who was a customer of a parking ramp owned and
operated by the defendants, was assaulted and raped by a third
29
party while in that parking ramp. The court considered whether
the defendants owed a duty to protect the customer from criminal
30
assaults by third parties. The court recognized a duty to protect
depends on the relationship of the parties and the foreseeability of
31
the harm. The court stated:
If the law is to impose a duty on A to protect B from C’s
criminal acts, the law usually looks for a special
relationship between A and B, a situation where B has in
some way entrusted his or her safety to A and A has
accepted that entrustment. This special relationship also
assumes that the harm represented by C is something that
A is in a position to protect against and should be
32
expected to protect against.
The court in Erickson noted that, “the law has been cautious
33
and reluctant to impose a duty to protect” on businesses.
34
“Ultimately, the question is one of policy.” The court considered
the defendants’ policy arguments that law enforcement is a
government function and a jury would have to speculate to
35
conclude additional security would have prevented the crime.
The court also considered that the parking lot was in a downtown
metropolitan area, was dimly lit with low ceilings, and was full of
36
unoccupied cars—conditions which attracted criminal activity.
The court concluded these characteristics presented a
other source through which parents can get reliable information about
this essential service than from the county, the licensing and inspection
authority.
Id. at 844 (Wahl, J., concurring specially).
27. Id. at 843 (majority opinion).
28. 447 N.W.2d 165, 169-70 (Minn. 1989).
29. Id. at 166.
30. Id. at 168-70.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 168.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 169.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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unique opportunity for criminals and their criminal
activities . . . which to some degree is different from that
presented out on the street and in the neighborhood
generally. We do not think the law should say the
operator of a parking ramp owes no duty to protect its
37
customers. Some duty is owed.
Though the court initially stated the existence of a duty to
protect from criminal harm depended on the relationship of the
parties, the court did not analyze the relationship between the
38
plaintiff and the defendants.
The court also ruled in Erickson that the security company
hired to patrol the ramp owed the plaintiff a duty to protect her
39
from the criminal assault. The security company argued it did not
owe a duty to the plaintiff, who was a customer of the parking ramp
40
and not the adjoining hotel, which hired the security company.
The court reasoned the security company undertook a duty to
patrol the entire ramp and all of its customers, including the
41
plaintiff. The court relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts section
324A to state that liability is imposed “on a defendant who
undertakes for another (whether gratuitously or for a
consideration) to perform a duty owed by the other to a third
42
person.” Thus, when the security company was hired to protect
the hotel’s customers, it also undertook a duty to protect the

37. Id.
38. The court in Erickson did not cite or rely on its ruling in Andrade. Instead,
the court relied on two of its prior rulings and a court of appeals ruling in cases
where plaintiffs tried to hold defendants liable for their failure to protect plaintiffs
from criminal acts of third parties. Id. at 168 (citing Pietila v. Congdon, 362
N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985) (holding defendant trustees as possessors of land
did not owe duty to prevent murder of nurse of trust beneficiary in beneficiary’s
home, reasoning “[i]nasmuch as no police force has ever achieved that goal, the
plaintiff cannot intend the imposition of an absolute obligation to prevent all
crime”)); Sylvester v. Nw. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 43 N.W.2d 17
(1952) (holding hospital owed a duty to protect its patient from assault and injury
when it knew or should have known another patient who was staggering and
intoxicated was likely to injure other patients, taking into account the vulnerability
of the patient and foreseeability of the danger); Roettger v. United Hosps. of St.
Paul, Inc., 380 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming denial of motion for
new trial because there was sufficient evidence the hospital’s failure to provide
adequate security was a direct cause of patient’s injury from assault by hospital
trespasser)).
39. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 170.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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43

parking ramp’s customers.
Following the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Erickson,
Minnesota courts have routinely rejected claims of a duty to
protect. For example, in 1993 in Harper v. Herman, the supreme
court considered whether a boat owner owed his social guest, a
twenty-year-old man who was injured when he dove from a boat
into shallow water, a duty to tell the guest that the water
44
surrounding the boat was too shallow to dive. The guest argued
that a special relationship required the boat owner to protect him
when the boat owner, “as a social host, allowed an inexperienced
45
diver on his boat.” The court recognized that generally a special
relationship giving rise to a duty “is only found on the part of
common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of land who hold it open
to the public, and persons who have custody of another person
under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of
46
normal opportunities of self-protection.” The court further noted
that in instances where a duty is owed because someone has
custody of another person, “the plaintiff is typically in some respect
particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who,
correspondingly, holds considerable power over the plaintiff’s
welfare . . . . Fairness in such cases thus may require the defendant
to use his power to help the plaintiff, based upon the plaintiff’s
47
expectation of protection . . . .”
The supreme court in Harper found that the plaintiff was
48
neither vulnerable nor lacked the ability to protect himself. The
court distinguished its prior holding in Andrade. “Andrade involved
a group of plaintiffs who had little opportunity to protect
themselves, children in day care, and a defendant to whom the
plaintiffs looked for protection. In this case, Harper was not
deprived of opportunities to protect himself, and [the boat owner]
49
was not expected to provide protection.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court next considered the duty to
protect in 1995 in Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
499 N.W.2d 472, 473-74 (Minn. 1993).
Id. at 474.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)).
Id. at 474 n.2 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAWS OF TORTS § 56, at 374 (5th ed. 1984)).
48. Id. at 474.
49. Id. at 475.
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50

Duluth, when it again found no duty was owed. The decedent
committed suicide while she was a resident of a Young Women’s
Christian Association (YWCA) housing facility in Duluth,
51
Minnesota. The decedent had rented a room from the YWCA on
52
a monthly basis. The facility had a front desk that was staffed
twenty-four hours a day and handled mail and incoming calls for
53
residents who did not have private phones in their rooms. The
YWCA also patrolled the halls of the facility during nighttime
54
hours. Decedent, who had a borderline personality disorder and
was being treated by a psychiatrist, committed suicide in her
55
There was some evidence the YWCA was aware the
room.
56
decedent was in distress. The supreme court reasoned that even if
it assumed the YWCA ran its housing facility like a hotel and a
special relationship was thus created similar to that recognized
between an innkeeper and guest, that did not necessarily mean the
57
YWCA had a duty to protect decedent from harming herself.
Though the court recognized a hospital may have a duty to protect
patients from foreseeable suicides, the relationship between the
decedent and the YWCA “bore little resemblance to the caretaking
58
relationship of a hospital toward its patients . . . .” The YWCA was
not aware of decedent’s medical history, did not provide services or
have the expertise to treat mental health problems, and did not
59
have custody or control of decedent. Additionally, decedent had
not entrusted her care to the YWCA, which in turn did not agree to
care for her and was not in a position to protect her from
60
committing suicide.
The supreme court concluded “that the
relationship between the YWCA and [decedent] lacked the degree
of dependence and control necessary to form a special relationship
which created a duty on the part of the YWCA to prevent
61
[decedent’s] suicide.”
50. 539 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Minn. 1995).
51. Id. at 790.
52. Id. at 791.
53. Id. at 791 n.1.
54. Id. at 790-91.
55. Id. at 791.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 792.
58. Id. at 793.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Bigos v. Kluender, 611 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that a landlord had no duty to warn a tenant not to grill items on balcony
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Also in 1995, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized a
duty of care was owed to a child who died of diabetes because he
did not receive medical care. In Lundman v. McKown, an elevenyear-old child suffered juvenile onset diabetes but did not receive
any medical treatment because the Christian Scientists who cared
for him (including his mother) instead believed in providing
62
spiritual treatment through prayer. Because the child’s mother
and stepfather realized he was very ill, they hired a specially trained
63
Christian Science practitioner to provide spiritual treatment. This
practitioner never came to the child’s house, but was paid to pray
64
for the child. When the child’s condition worsened, the mother
and stepfather contacted a committee member of the Christian
Science Church, and the committee member in turn contacted the
mother church of the Christian Science religion regarding the
65
child’s illness. The mother also hired a Christian Science nurse
66
who came to the home and provided prayer and care to the child.
After four days of displaying increasingly worsening symptoms of
juvenile onset diabetes, the child died without ever receiving any
medical treatment because such treatment was against his mother’s
67
and stepfather’s religious beliefs.
The court of appeals held that the mother of the child had a
duty to protect her vulnerable child from harm because she had a
68
special relationship with the child.
The court of appeals also
analyzed whether a duty was owed by: (1) the child’s stepfather, (2)
the Christian Science nurse, (3) the Christian Science practitioner
hired to pray for the child, (4) a church official who reported the
child’s illness to the church, (5) a Christian Science nursing home,
69
and (6) the Christian Science church.
The court ruled the stepfather had a special relationship with
the child because he assisted the child by calling the church
committee member, carrying the child to and from meals, and
70
The court stated:
attending to the helpless child’s needs.
that started fire because courts are reluctant to impose liability for self-inflicted
harm).
62. 530 N.W.2d 807, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 814, 822-23.
65. Id. at 814.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 813-15.
68. Id. at 820.
69. Id. at 820-26.
70. Id. at 820-21.
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“Independent of [the stepfather’s] conduct during [the child’s]
final illness, we believe there also is a presumption that ‘custodial’
stepparents (and ‘visitation’ stepparents during visitation) assume
71
special relationship duties to stepchildren.” The court concluded
the stepfather “was obligated to put [the child’s] interests first—
above and beyond [the mother’s] interest in exercising her
religious beliefs,” and was obligated to “step forward to rescue” the
72
child.
The court found the Christian Science nurse had a special
relationship with the child because the child was helpless and she
accepted the responsibility of caring for him, by reading him
prayers, comforting him, cleaning him, and attending to his
73
physical care.
Both indicia of a “special relationship” apply: [the nurse]
had significant “custody or control” of [the child] under
circumstances where [the child] lacked even his limited
minor’s capacity for self-protection—that is why mother
hired [the nurse]—and she accepted the responsibility to
care for [the child] and to protect him by providing
74
professional services in return for cash wages.
The nurse argued she had no duty to advise medical treatment
71. Id.
72. Id. at 821; c.f. Sunnarborg v. Howard, 581 N.W.2d 397 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997). In Sunnarborg, the court of appeals considered whether a minor’s uncle was
in a special relationship with her, which required him to protect her from being
sexually abused by her father. 581 N.W.2d at 398. The uncle had assumed
custody of the minor child in his own home, along with responsibilities for making
sure she was cared for and attended school. Id. at 399. Subsequently, the minor’s
father moved in with the uncle and began sexually abusing his minor daughter.
Id. The uncle continued to care for the child while the father lived in his home.
Id. The court of appeals found the uncle did not owe any duty to protect the child
from her father. Id. at 399. The court reasoned there had been no legal
restriction or termination of the father’s parental rights. Id. Once the father
moved into the uncle’s home, the uncle “was in the position of a social host.” Id.
The court further reasoned the father had not imposed any responsibility on the
uncle to protect the minor child from her father, nor had the uncle agreed to
accept such responsibility. Id. The court therefore concluded that when the
father was present, no special relationship existed between the minor child and
her uncle. Id. The court distinguished Lundman on grounds the stepfather in
that case was married to the child’s mother, and the other defendants in Lundman
who were found to owe a duty had a contractual relationship with the child. Id.
The court of appeals in Sunnarborg affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the uncle on grounds he owed no duty to protect the minor child from
being sexually molested by her father. Id. at 399-400.
73. Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 821-22.
74. Id. at 821.
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because that was “antithetical to Christian Science nursing.” She
further argued the child’s parents, not the nurse, decided what
76
care the child should receive. The court rejected both arguments,
reasoning the nurse’s duty was “to make [the child’s] welfare her
77
paramount interest.” “During a good part of her involvement,
though it was brief, a telephone call to involve a provider of
conventional medical care would likely have led to the
administration of insulin and would likely have saved [the child’s]
78
life.”
The Lundman court next considered the duty owed by the
79
Christian Science practitioner hired to pray for the child. The
80
practitioner argued his only duty was to pray for the child. The
court disagreed because the practitioner “accepted a responsibility
to serve [the child] and thereafter, through conversations with the
mother and nurse, held considerable power over [the child’s]
81
welfare.”
The court noted the practitioner was in continuous
contact with the mother and nurse from the time he was hired until
82
moments before the child’s death.
The court concluded the
practitioner “accepted a professional’s responsibility for [the
83
child’s] healthcare.”
By contrast, the Lundman court found no duty was owed to the
child by the Christian Science church official who received three
telephone calls about the child’s health condition and notified
84
church headquarters.
The court found no special relationship
between the church official and the child because “neither of the
two definitions of a ‘special relationship’ applies; [the church
official] never accepted ‘power’ over [the child], [nor did he
85
assume] a responsibility to protect him.”
Rather, the church
official “declined any personal obligation he might otherwise have
assumed” when he told the child’s parents to call a professional
86
when they told him they wanted Christian Science care.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id. at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 822.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
Id.; see also H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittenmore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 706-09
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Moreover, the church official was not in steady contact with the onscene caregivers, and was not hired to pray for the child, but
87
instead simply had knowledge of his illness. “Mere knowledge of
an illness, without either an assumed obligation of care or prior
relationship, is insufficient to create a special relationship . . . . To
base duty on mere knowledge with power would implicate
88
neighbors, grandparents, and friends.”
The court noted that
basing liability on knowledge and power alone, without first
establishing a legal duty was owed, “reduces the question of
negligence into a ‘but for’ causation test,” reasoning which has
89
been rejected by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
The court in Lundman similarly found no duty was owed by the
Christian Science nursing home facility that had received several
telephone calls regarding the child’s care and sent a nurse to care
90
for him. The court reasoned the nursing home “never assumed
‘considerable power’ over [the child’s] welfare,” nor did it accept
“any professional responsibility to serve [the child], but simply—
without compensation—provided suggestions for care, in contrast
to [the nurse] and [the practitioner], the professionals who were
91
hired to actually care for [the child] on an ongoing basis.” The
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the nurse sent by the
nursing home was an agent of the nursing home because the
nursing home did not have any right to control the nurse’s actions,
the nurse could have refused the referral, there was no contact
between the child’s parents or the nurse and the nursing home
after the nurse was engaged, and the nursing home was not paid
92
for the services the nurse provided to the child.
Finally, the court in Lundman found no duty was owed to the
93
Plaintiff argued the
child by the Christian Science church.
Christian Science nurse and practitioner were agents of the church,

(Minn. 1996) (holding there was no special relationship between trailer park
manager and children who were residents of the trailer park in part because the
manager rejected the entrustment of their care when she told them to report
sexual molestation by another resident to their parents).
87. Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 823.
88. Id. at 823-24.
89. Id. at 824 (citing Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn.
1994)).
90. Id. at 824-25.
91. Id. at 824.
92. Id. at 824-25.
93. Id. at 825.
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94

and the church authorized their acts.
The court rejected this
argument on grounds that there “was no evidence that the church
had a right to control the means and manner” in which the nurse
95
and the practitioner cared for the child. The court found that an
agency relationship was not created between the church and the
nurse and the practitioner simply because the church listed their
96
names in an advertisement. The court reasoned that, though the
Christian Science church could advise its nurses and practitioners
that they should suggest medical care when a child’s life is
threatened, “mere power is not sufficient for the imposition of a
97
duty.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court next addressed the question of
whether a special relationship resulting in a duty to protect arose in
the 1996 case of H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, when the court
98
ruled no duty was owed. In Whittemore, children in a trailer park
reported to the trailer park manager that another tenant of the
99
trailer park was sexually assaulting them. The tenant previously
told the manager that he had been convicted of a sexual crime in
100
the past.
Instead of reporting the children’s complaints, the
101
The children
manager told the children to tell their parents.
102
reported the assaults to their parents a few weeks later.
The
parents sued the owners and operators of the trailer park, arguing
the manager had a special relationship with their children and
owed a duty to protect them from sexual assaults by another tenant
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 826. The court additionally reasoned:
[A] church is not a lawn-mower manufacturer that can be found
negligent in a products liability case for failing to affix a warning sticker
near the blades. As previously noted, the constitutional right to religious
freedom includes the authority of churches—not courts—to
independently decide matters of faith and doctrine, and for a church as
an institution to believe and speak what it will. When it comes to
restraining religious conduct, it is the obligation of the state, not a church
and its agents, to impose and communicate the necessary limitations—to
attach the warning sticker. A church always remains free to espouse
whatever religious belief it chooses; it is the practices of its adherents that may
be subject to state sanctions.
Id.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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103

because they were vulnerable children. The supreme court held
that the manager did not have a special relationship with the
104
children, and thus, did not owe them a duty. The court reasoned
that, unlike the vulnerable day care infants in Andrade, the trailer
park manager in Whittemore did not have custody or control of the
105
vulnerable children who were being molested. The court further
reasoned that, unlike the defendants in Erickson, the manager did
not accept the entrustment of the children’s care, but rather
rejected that entrustment when she told the children to tell their
106
parents about the sexual assaults.
The dissent in Whittemore argued that a special relationship
giving rise to a duty to protect should be found, stating:
In order to reach its conclusion, the majority opinion
reads Erickson to impose a greater duty of care and
responsibility on the owner of a parking ramp, relative to
its patrons, than upon adults to whom children report
criminal sexual abuse. In my view, the majority reads the
“parking ramp case” too narrowly, essentially limiting the
holding of Erickson to its facts. While in Erickson we held
that a special duty arose because of the unique
circumstances that exist in a parking ramp which gave rise
to the risk of crime, a risk which the parking ramp
operator was in a position to deter, nothing in the
opinion suggests that those were the only types of special
circumstances which might give rise to a duty.
I conclude, as did the court of appeals in the present
case, that there are unusual circumstances, equal to those
in Erickson, though different, that give rise to a duty on the
part of the mobile home park.
These special
circumstances include: the reports to the park manager by
the children that they were being abused; the inability of
the children to protect themselves against the ongoing
criminal assault; the high level of protection against child
sexual abuse afforded by state public policy; and the

103. Id. at 709.
104. Id. at 709-10.
105. Id. at 708-09. The trailer park manager did not provide any care for these
children at any time, nor did the parents drop them off at the manager’s
residence expecting that she would provide their children with care. See also
D.E.L. v. Blue Earth County, 2004 WL 728090, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2004)
(holding foster parents, not county, had control of foster child, therefore the
county owed no duty to protect).
106. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss4/7

14

Bartell and Neubauer: Laska v. Anoka County: A Quest for Justice for an Infant Who Died
12BARTELL-NEUBAUER.DOC

2006]

5/31/2006 1:17:32 PM

LASKA V. ANOKA COUNTY

1563

statutory provision that requires that there be a resident
caretaker in each mobile home park, with an obligation to
107
“be readily available at all times in case of emergency.”
The Whittemore majority rejected these arguments by the
dissent, reasoning “[a]n adult who does not stand in a caretaking
relationship with a child should not have thrust upon her an illdefined legal responsibility to take ‘some reasonable action’—as
suggested by the dissent—because the child chose to report
108
Though the majority recognized the
mistreatment to her.”
emotional appeal of the dissent’s conclusion that a special
relationship existed in Whittemore, the majority concluded “none of
the bases cited by the dissent for finding a special relationship even
remotely falls within the parameters this court has carefully carved
out as the outer boundaries for this exception to the common law
109
rule . . . .”
In the 1999 case of Gilbertson v. Leininger, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that homeowners did not have a special
relationship with a social guest who suffered a head injury at the
defendants’ home and therefore, the defendants owed no duty to
110
act for the guest’s protection.
Plaintiff Gilbertson was a
111
Thanksgiving guest at the home of defendant. She drank a bottle
of wine and a beer throughout the day and evening, and stayed
112
overnight at defendants’ home.
The next morning when
Gilbertson awoke, defendants noticed she had blood under her
113
nose and had defecated in her pants.
They concluded she was
114
Gilbertson stayed at the defendants’ home
still intoxicated.
115
When she awoke later in the
throughout that day, sleeping.
afternoon and still had not cleaned herself up, defendants called a
nurse who told them to stimulate Gilbertson by giving her caffeine

107. Id. at 710 (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
108. Id. at 709 (majority opinion).
109. Id. (quoting Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993)
(defining these parameters to include “common carriers, innkeepers, possessors of
land who hold it open to the public, and persons who have custody of another
person under circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal
opportunities of self-protection”)).
110. 599 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Minn. 1999).
111. Id. at 129.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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116

and cleaning her up.
Eventually another friend came to the
defendants’ home, saw Gilbertson’s condition, and told them to
117
call 911, which they did.
Gilbertson was taken to the hospital,
118
where she was diagnosed with a head injury requiring surgery.
Gilbertson sued the defendants on the theory that they should have
119
sought medical treatment for her earlier.
She claimed the
defendants “had custody of her under circumstances in which she
was deprived of normal opportunities of self-protection,” thereby
120
creating a duty to protect.
The supreme court disagreed, noting the defendants did not
have custody or control of Gilbertson, who was “merely a dinner
121
guest who happened to stay overnight.”
The court reasoned
Gilbertson did not “entrust her health” to defendants, and they
“did not accept responsibility to care for Gilbertson’s physical
122
condition.” The court further recognized that Gilbertson’s head
injury would have been difficult to diagnose, even by doctors, and
123
Under those
that the symptoms mimic those of intoxication.
circumstances, the defendants were “not in a position to protect
124
Gilbertson,” nor did she reasonably expect such protection. The
supreme court concluded defendants owed no duty to protect
125
Gilbertson.
Finally, in 2001, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered the
duty owed by a landlord to a tenant to protect the tenant from
126
criminal harm in the case of Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp.
The
127
In Funchess,
court found that the landlord owed no duty.

116. Id.
117. Id. at 130.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 131.
121. Id.; see Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539
N.W.2d 789, 792-93 (Minn. 1995) (“[The] duty [to protect] has most often been
found where an institution such as a hospital or jail has physical custody and
control of the person to be protected.”); Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474
(Minn. 1993) (finding no special relationship when the defendant did not hold
“considerable power over [plaintiff’s] welfare”).
122. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131; see H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore, 552
N.W.2d 705, 708-09 (Minn. 1996).
123. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131.
124. Id. at 131-32.
125. Id. at 132.
126. 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001).
127. Id. at 676.
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unidentified intruders murdered the decedent in his apartment.
Though the landlord was required by decedent’s lease agreement
to maintain common areas in a safe condition and make repairs
within a reasonable amount of time, there was evidence the security
locks and intercoms on decedent’s apartment building were not in
129
working order in the weeks prior to his death.
The trustee for
decedent’s heirs sued the landlord on the theory that his
negligence in failing to repair the locks and intercoms resulted in
the intruders being able to enter decedent’s apartment building
130
and murder him.
The court noted the general common law rule that a person
has no duty to protect others from harm caused by third parties
unless there is a special relationship between the parties and the
131
harm is foreseeable.
The court recognized the question is
132
ultimately one of public policy. It stated a duty to protect may be
imposed on the landlord if (1) decedent entrusted his safety to the
landlord; (2) the landlord accepted the entrustment; and (3) the
landlord was “in a position to, and should have been expected to
133
protect [decedent] from criminal attack.”
The court first found
there was no special relationship between the landlord and
decedent in Funchess, rejecting the conclusion of the court of
appeals that the landlord had exclusive control over building
134
security, thereby creating a special relationship.
The court also
was not persuaded that the third element of the test, that the
landlord was in a position to and should have been expected to

128. Id. at 668.
129. Id. at 669-70.
130. Id. at 671.
131. Id. at 673.
132. Id. The court noted:
In deciding whether a special relationship exists, we look to the following
policy considerations: crime prevention is essentially a government
function, not a private duty; criminals are unpredictable and bent on
defeating security measures; and because the issue arises where existing
security precautions have failed, the question will always be whether
further security measures were required and a property owner will have
little idea what is expected of him or her. Further we must consider the
relative costs and benefits of imposing a duty—the level of risk balanced
against the cost of providing the security that will reduce the risk to that
level.
Id. at 673 n.4 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 673; see Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn.
1989).
134. Funchess, 632 N.W.2d at 674.
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135

protect its tenant, was satisfied either. The court concluded that
there was no special relationship between the landlord and tenant
136
imposing on the landlord a duty to protect.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Funchess also rejected the
conclusion of the court of appeals that, by providing some security
measures, the landlord assumed a duty to maintain those security
137
measures already undertaken to protect decedent.
The court
recognized the rule that “one who voluntarily assumes a duty will
be liable for damages resulting from failure to use reasonable
138
care.”
As a matter of first impression, the court noted other
jurisdictions are split on the issue of whether landlords should be
subject to liability because they have taken reasonable measures to
139
provide security to tenants. It stated:
We are not inclined to establish a rule that would
discourage
landlords
from
improving
security.
Transforming a landlord’s gratuitous provision of security
measures into a duty to maintain those measures and
subjecting the landlord to liability for all harm occasioned
by a failure to maintain that security would tend to
discourage landlords from instituting security measures
140
for fear of being held liable for the actions of a criminal.
The supreme court reasoned that even if the outside security
door was malfunctioning, other security measures were in place,
including a security guard and the lock on the door to decedent’s
apartment, making it impossible for the court to conclude, as
required by Restatement section 323, that the landlord should have
recognized the outdoor security door was necessary for decedent’s
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 675.
138. Id. at 674 (citing Isler v. Burman, 305 Minn. 288, 295, 232 N.W.2d 818,
822 (1975)). The court further recognized the Restatement rule governing an
undertaking of a duty, as follows:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of
the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the
undertaking.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965)).
139. Id. at 674-75.
140. Id. at 675.
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protection.
The court decided the duty to maintain the security
locks and the intercom system did not result in liability being
imposed on the landlord for the acts of the criminals who entered
142
decedent’s apartment and murdered him.
In sum, the supreme
court concluded that the landlord owed no duty to protect
143
decedent from his killers.
In only three cases in the past twenty years—Andrade, Erickson,
and Lundman—have the Minnesota appellate courts found a duty
to protect was owed. In Andrade and Lundman, the duty arose
because the defendants were in a special relationship with
vulnerable children. The court in Erickson found a duty to protect
parking ramp customers from criminal harm arose as a matter of
public policy.
Against this backdrop, the court of appeals decided the Laska
case. In Laska, the issue was whether the adult daughter of a
licensed day care provider owed a duty to an infant in the day care
program when the daughter agreed to help her mother, the
provider, care for the children during a period when the mother
would be over her licensed capacity in terms of the number and
144
ages of children permitted in her day care program.
III. THE LASKA DECISION
145

Infant Hannah Laska was born in June of 2000.
She began
146
attending provider Joyce Jeffrey’s day care facility in July of 2000.
Jeffrey had a C2 day care license that allowed her to have a
maximum of twelve children, of which no more than two children
could be infants (under twelve months) or toddlers (twelve to thirty
147
months), of which only one could be an infant.
Because Jeffrey
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Laska v. Anoka County, 696 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), rev.
denied, (Minn. Aug. 16, 2005).
145. Id. at 136.
146. Id.
147. Id. Since 1983, Jeffrey had held a license from Anoka County to operate a
day care out of her home. Id. Anoka County is authorized by the State of
Minnesota to provide such day care licenses pursuant to the promulgated
administrative rules for such activities under Minnesota Statutes section 245A.03,
subdivision 1 and section 245A.16, subdivision 1. Minnesota Rules 9502.0367
establishes certain child/adult ratios and age-distribution restrictions for the
various licenses the State provides to day care providers. Based on these
regulations set forth in the rules, in order for Jeffrey to have an additional infant
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was going to have one toddler more than her license permitted,
Jeffrey applied to Anoka County for a capacity/age distribution
148
variance on August 15, 2000.
This variance allowed Jeffrey to
have an additional toddler for a ten-day period, between August 21,
149
As an alternative measure to
2000, and September 3, 2000.
ensure the health, safety, and protection of the children in the
Jeffrey day care facility during the variance period, Jeffrey stated on
her variance application that her adult daughter, Ginger Flohaug,
would be living at home with her during the variance period and
150
would be helping her care for the children.
Anoka County
granted Jeffrey’s capacity/age distribution variance on August 17,
151
2000.
Flohaug was Jeffrey’s twenty-three-year-old daughter, who had
grown up in her family’s home surrounded by Jeffrey’s day care
152
children since 1983. Flohaug had assisted Jeffrey with the care of
153
the children and had been Jeffrey’s helper over the years.
Growing up, Flohaug had played with the children, fed them, and
154
changed their diapers.
On several prior occasions, Jeffrey had
155
listed Flohaug as a helper on variance applications.
or toddler, she was required to identify specific measures that would ensure that
the health and safety of the children would be protected—in this case, that a
second caregiver (her daughter) would be present. See MINN. R. 9502.0335, subp.
8a (2005); MINN. R. 9502.0367. The issue of the ratio of adults to children in
licensed day care facilities has been central to the issue of child care safety since
the Minnesota Department of Human Services promulgated rules regulating day
care facilities. See, e.g., Handle With Care, Inc. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 406
N.W.2d 518 (Minn. 1987) (involving challenge to day care regulations adopted by
the Department of Human Services despite the Department’s failure to comply
with statutory study and report requirements).
148. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136. Under Minnesota Rule 9502.0335, subpart 8,
day care providers may request a variance to allow them to exceed their license
capacity under certain circumstances.
149. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136.
150. Id. The regulations require a provider who applies for a capacity variance
to state alternative measures that would be provided to ensure the health, safety,
and protection of the children in the day care. MINN. R. 9502.0335, subp. 8a.
Jeffrey wrote on the variance request that “I will have good, reliable help. My
daughter is a [physical education] and health teacher who loves kids.” Laska, 696
N.W.2d at 136.
151. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136.
152. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 4, Laska v. Anoka County, 696 N.W.2d
133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (No. A04-1661), 2004 WL 3403980.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id.
155. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136. In 1991 and 1992, Jeffrey had listed Flohaug as
a helper on her variance requests. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at AA 0116-
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On August 20, 2000, Flohaug had moved back home after
156
Prior to Flohaug moving back home,
graduating from college.
Jeffrey had asked Flohaug for assistance with her day care children
157
during the variance period.
Flohaug had stated to Jeffrey that
158
Jeffrey
she would be “around to help” with Jeffrey’s day care.
relayed Flohaug’s agreement to help with the day care children
during the variance period to the county social worker during a re159
licensing inspection at Jeffrey’s day care on August 14, 2000.
On August 21, 2000, the first date of the variance, Flohaug was
160
present at the Jeffrey day care in the morning.
She left the day
care around 11:00 a.m. for a job interview and did not return to the
161
day care until two to three hours later. Katherine Laska brought
her daughter, infant Hannah, to the Jeffrey day care around noon,
162
before Flohaug had returned from her job interview. Jeffrey put
163
Hannah down for a nap in a rear bedroom around 1:30 p.m.
Although day care providers are required to sleep infants in
164
165
approved cribs and are advised to sleep infants on their backs,
Jeffrey placed Hannah on her stomach on top of a thick comforter
166
on an adult bed. Around 2:00 p.m., Flohaug returned to the day
167
Flohaug
care and began helping Jeffrey care for the children.
168
also took care of a toddler who fell and cut her forehead.
Around 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m., Jeffrey entered the bedroom where
169
Neither Jeffrey
Hannah was sleeping to retrieve another child.
nor Flohaug checked on Hannah until 4:30 p.m. when Flohaug
170
entered the bedroom to watch television.
During a commercial
23.
156. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. MINN. R. 9502.0425, subp. 9 (2005).
165. See Laska v. Anoka County, No. A05-315, 2005 WL 3470036, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005), rev. denied, (Minn. Mar. 14, 2006).
166. Id. at *3.
167. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 136-37.
168. Id. at 137.
169. Id.
170. Id. However, the court of appeals found that both the police report and
coroner’s report state that Flohaug informed the police and coroner that
“sometime between [3:30 and 4:00] she had gone into the bedroom and that she
had heard the baby making some type of crying noise or was just making
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break about ten minutes later, she rolled Hannah over and saw that
Hannah had “a bluish tinge to the face” and that she was not
171
breathing.
Jeffrey performed CPR on Hannah, while Flohaug
172
The paramedics arrived at
supervised the rest of the children.
173
the day care, but they were unable to resuscitate Hannah.
174
Hannah was pronounced dead at the hospital.
The Anoka County Coroner’s office determined that Hannah’s
cause of death was Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) and that
significant conditions contributing to Hannah’s death included
175
“prone sleeping position on an adult-type bed.” Hannah was only
176
ten weeks old when she died on August 21, 2000.
Laska commenced a wrongful death action alleging claims of
negligence and negligence per se against Anoka County, Jeffrey,
177
and Flohaug for the death of Hannah.
Flohaug moved for
summary judgment, arguing that she owed no duty of care to the
children in the Jeffrey day care facility, including Hannah, that she
had not breached any duty of care, and that there was no evidence
178
she could have foreseen the harm that occurred to Hannah.
The district court granted Flohaug’s summary judgment
179
It ruled that Flohaug did not owe a duty to Hannah
motion.
because no special relationship existed between Flohaug and
180
Hannah.
The district court also found that there was no
evidence that Flohaug foresaw the risk of Hannah, an infant, being
on an adult bed when she saw Hannah lying on the bed late in the
181
afternoon. Laska appealed the district court’s ruling to the court
182
of appeals.
In its opinion issued May 17, 2005, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed the district court’s ruling and found that Flohaug
had assumed a duty of care to Hannah because she had accepted
the entrustment of every child in the Jeffrey day care facility,
nondescript noises in general.” Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 8.
173. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 137.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 136.
176. Id. at 136-37.
177. Id. at 137.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See generally Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 133.
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thereby creating a special relationship with Hannah that day.
Courts have long recognized that an essential element of a
negligence claim is that the defendant owed a legal duty of care to
184
the plaintiff.
As set out in detail above, Minnesota courts have
held that, as a general rule, a person does not owe a duty to protect
185
another from harm caused by third parties.
However, a duty to
protect can arise in certain cases based on two factors: “(1) the
relationship of the parties, and (2) the foreseeability of the risk
186
involved.”
A. First Factor: Special Relationship
Laska argued that a special relationship existed between
Flohaug and Hannah because Hannah was a vulnerable infant in
need of protection and because Flohaug had custody and control
over Hannah’s care on August 21, 2000, while Hannah was present
187
Laska based her argument on
at the Jeffrey day care facility.
Lundman v. McKown, which held that a duty to aid another person
188
exists if there is a special relationship between the parties.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a special relationship
arises when one person has “custody of another person under
circumstances in which that other person is deprived of normal
189
opportunities of self-protection.”
The court of appeals in Laska relied on two cases, Donaldson v.
Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth and Harper v. Herman, to
determine when a plaintiff is considered to be a vulnerable person
190
who is in need of protection from others.
In Donaldson, the
supreme court recognized that a duty may arise when “the plaintiff
is in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on the
defendant, who in turn holds considerable power over the
183. Id. at 138-39.
184. Id. at 137-38 (citing Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn.
1995)); see also Schweich v. Ziegler, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1990).
185. See supra Part II.
186. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d
127, 130 (Minn. 1999)).
187. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 12-13.
188. Id. at 12; Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a special relationship can arise among parties when a party is
entrusted with the custody of a vulnerable dependent person).
189. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472,
474 (Minn. 1993)).
190. Id.; see also Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539
N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995); Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474-75.
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191

plaintiff’s welfare.”
In contrast, a person who has the ability to
protect himself or herself from harm is not vulnerable like in the
Harper case where the plaintiff was an adult who knew how to
192
protect himself from danger.
Based on these cases, the Laska
court recognized that a duty may be owed “where one person has
‘custody of another person under circumstances in which that
other person is deprived of normal opportunities of self193
protection.’”
Laska argued that Hannah was a vulnerable infant who was in
need of protection and that her case was factually analogous to that
of the ill child in Lundman where the court ruled various adults
were in a special relationship with the child and, therefore, owed a
194
duty to him.
Laska contended that Hannah was similarly a
vulnerable and dependent infant who had no ability to care for
herself and who relied on the day care providers at the Jeffrey day
care on August 21 to protect her because her parents were not
195
present to provide any protection or care for Hannah.
Flohaug conceded to the court of appeals that Hannah was a
196
vulnerable person.
Based on Flohaug’s concession, the court of
appeals concluded that under Andrade, Hannah was a vulnerable
197
infant. In Andrade, the supreme court found that “small children
in a licensed day care facility are a particular protected class . . .
[that] consists of uniquely vulnerable persons: small children, often
infants, left by their working parents in a home other than their
own, and left in the care of another person for some period of less
198
than 24 hours of the day.”
Because the parties did not dispute that Hannah was a
vulnerable infant who was unable to protect herself, the only real

191. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792 (holding
that low income housing facility had no special relationship with, and thus, no
duty to protect a tenant from committing suicide)).
192. Id. at 138; see Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474-75 (holding that although boat
owner was an experienced boater, the boat owner did not owe a duty to his social
guest, a twenty-year-old man, to tell the guest that the water was too shallow to
dive, because the social guest was not particularly vulnerable and did not lack the
ability to protect himself).
193. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138 (quoting Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474).
194. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 13, Laska, 696 N.W.2d 133 (No. A04-1661);
see also supra text accompanying notes 67 and 82 (analyzing Lundman,).
195. See Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 194, at 13.
196. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn. 1986)).
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issues the court needed to address to determine if a special
relationship existed between Flohaug and Hannah were (1)
whether Hannah’s safety had in some way been entrusted to
199
Flohaug, and (2) whether Flohaug accepted the entrustment.
The court of appeals framed the issue as “whether, in offering to
‘help’ her mother in the day care during the variance period
beginning August 21, Flohaug accepted the entrustment of the
care and custody of the entire group of dependent children,
200
including Hannah.”
The court of appeals reviewed the district court’s decision to
determine whether the district court erred in finding that Laska
201
“did not entrust Hannah’s safety to Flohaug.”
The district court
had concluded, based on Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., that “[n]o
relationship whatsoever existed between Flohaug and [Laska] or
202
Hannah, much less a special relationship.
The district court
reasoned there was no special relationship between Hannah and
Flohaug because Flohaug had never met Hannah or her mother
prior to the date of Hannah’s death, Flohaug was not present when
Hannah arrived that day at Jeffrey’s day care, and Flohaug was not
203
The
present when Jeffrey placed Hannah on the bed for a nap.
court of appeals rejected the district court’s conclusion and ruled
that Flohaug accepted the entrustment of every child in the day
204
care on August 21, thereby assuming a duty of care to Hannah.
Flohaug argued on appeal that she should not have been
expected to care for Hannah and created no special relationship
with Hannah for several reasons, including (1) neither Laska nor
Jeffrey had entrusted Hannah to her care, (2) she had no prior
contact with Laska and was not present when Laska dropped
Hannah off at the day care, (3) she lacked “a sufficient degree of
contact” with Hannah on August 21, (4) Jeffrey never specifically
addressed Hannah’s care with Flohaug, (5) Flohaug had never
checked on sleeping infants in the past, (6) she was not in a

199. Id. at 138-39.
200. Id. at 138.
201. See Order and Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
202. Id. As set out more fully above, the Minnesota Supreme Court held in
Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 2001), that a landlord
did not have a duty to protect a tenant from being murdered by intruders who
entered the tenant’s apartment apparently due to broken locks on the security
doors and intercoms that did not work.
203. See Order and Memorandum, supra note 4, at 3.
204. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 138-39.
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position to reject Hannah’s entrustment because she was never in a
position to accept her entrustment, and (7) she never undertook
Jeffrey’s duty of care to Hannah as evidenced by her lack of contact
205
with Hannah.
Moreover, Flohaug contended that the court
should focus its review of whether a special relationship arose solely
on Flohaug’s lack of interaction with Hannah and ignore the fact
that Flohaug had provided care for other children in the day care
206
on August 21.
In contrast, Laska argued on appeal that Flohaug had a special
relationship with every child in the Jeffrey day care because under
Erickson, the scope of her duty extended to every child, including
Hannah, since each vulnerable child was left in the physical custody
207
and control of Jeffrey and Flohaug on August 21.
Laska also
relied on Whittemore to support her argument that because Flohaug
did not refuse to take care of any specific day care children, she
accepted the entrustment of and therefore had a special
208
relationship with all of the children in the day care on August 21.
205. Brief and Appendix of Respondents Ginger R. Flohaug f/k/a Ginger R.
Jeffrey & Joyce Jeffrey at 11-12, 16, 19-20, Laska, 696 N.W.2d 133 (No. A04-1661).
Specifically, Flohaug argued that she did not see Hannah until after 4 p.m. when
she went into the bedroom where Hannah was napping. Id. Flohaug relied on
Lundman, arguing she, like the church committee member in that case, knew of
the danger to the child but did not have a special relationship due to lack of
sufficient contact with the child. Id. at 15-18 (citing Lundman v. McKown, 530
N.W.2d 807, 820-28 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)). She also contended that under
Donaldson, knowledge of a potential harm to a person was not enough to create a
legal duty of care to an individual because Flohaug must have a degree of control
and dependency necessary to form a special relationship. Id. at 16-18 (citing
Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 790, 793
(Minn. 1995)).
206. Id. at 12.
207. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 15-17. Laska argued that the district
court improperly relied on Funchess, which is distinguishable because that case
considered whether a landlord had a duty to protect a tenant from the criminal
acts of third persons. Id. at 17-18. Laska maintained that the analogous case of
Lundman, which considered the duty owed to a vulnerable child in the custody
and control of various adults, provided a more compelling precedent. Id. at 15-18.
In Erickson, the court held that a security company that agreed to provide security
to the particular patrons of a parking ramp also owed a duty to protect all patrons
on the premises of the ramp because the security company patrolled the entire
parking ramp without limiting its patrol to the particular patrons’ vehicles.
Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 170 (Minn. 1989).
208. Appellant’s Brief supra note 152, at 16-17. Flohaug cared for an injured
toddler during the afternoon on August 21 by providing her first aid after she
tripped on some shoes. Id. at 8. Flohaug also testified during her deposition that
she handled “chaos control” at the day care that day. Id. at 7. In Whittemore, the
court held that a special relationship was not established between a trailer park
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Finally, Laska contended that the proper test to determine the
existence of a special relationship under Minnesota law is not the
amount of contact Flohaug had with Hannah, but whether Flohaug
209
had custody or control of Hannah.
The court of appeals agreed with Laska and found that
Flohaug accepted the entrustment of every child in the Jeffrey day
care facility because neither Jeffrey nor Flohaug restricted
Flohaug’s care to any specific day care children and because
Flohaug “subsequently acted in a manner consistent with that
210
acceptance.” The court of appeals reasoned:
[T]he record is clear that Flohaug specifically promised
her mother that she would help in the day care during the
variance period without indicating that her assistance
would be restricted to specific children. The record is
also clear that Jeffrey placed no limitation on Flohaug’s
function when she identified her to the county of the
variance application as a “helper.” There is no evidence—
and Flohaug does not assert—that Flohaug only agreed to
care for certain children or rejected the entrustment of
manager who knew that a sex offender lived at the trailer park, and sexually
abused children who were residents of the trailer park. H.B. ex rel. Clark v.
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 706-09 (Minn. 1996). The court based its holding
on the facts that the manager did not have custody of the children, did not
exercise control over their safety, and rejected their entrustment by telling them
to report the sexual abuse to their parents. Id. at 708-09.
Laska also relied on persuasive cases from other jurisdictions that have
recognized that babysitters assume a duty of care to the children for whom they
agree to provide care. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 194, at 10; see Standifer
v. Pate, 282 So. 2d 261, 262-65 (Ala. 1973) (holding that a volunteer babysitter who
undertook the care of an eighteen-month-old child also had assumed a duty of
care and was in turn liable for negligently supervising a child that pulled a skillet
of hot grease off the counter and burned himself); Barbarishi v. Caruso, 135 A.2d
539, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (holding that although a grandmother
did not normally have a duty of care to protect her grandchildren from harm, the
grandmother assumed this duty when she gratuitously agreed with the children’s
mother to babysit those grandchildren and was liable when the grandson broke his
arm in the washing machine while unsupervised); Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.E.2d 313,
313-14 (N.Y. 1965) (holding that an uncle and aunt who gratuitously undertook
the care of a young child, assumed a duty of reasonable care for the child and
were liable for her injuries).
209. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 194, at 4. Laska argued that
Whittemore, Lundman, and Donaldson did not require any particular degree of
contact for a special relationship to be established. Id. Rather, these cases
required the party to be in the custody or control of the defendant. Id.; see
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 706-09; Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 813-24; Donaldson, 539
N.W.2d at 789.
210. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 139-40.
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211

any child or children.
Consequently, the court of appeals held “that Flohaug assumed a
212
duty of care toward Hannah.”
The court of appeals also rejected Flohaug’s argument that she
did not owe a duty to Hannah because she did not undertake the
213
duties of Jeffrey to Hannah.
The court of appeals found that
Flohaug voluntarily undertook Jeffrey’s duty of care to every child
in the Jeffrey day care facility that day, relying on the Restatement
214
(Second) of Torts section 324A and Erickson. Section 324A provides
that a defendant undertakes a duty of care to another when a
“defendant . . . undertakes for another (whether gratuitously or for
consideration) to perform a duty owed by the other to a third
215
person.”
The court of appeals reasoned that because Flohaug
agreed to help Jeffrey care for Jeffrey’s day care children during
the variance period, and because Jeffrey owed a duty to every child
in the day care, the scope of Flohaug’s duty of care was the same as
Jeffrey’s—a duty to care for every child in Jeffrey’s day care on
216
August 21.
211. Id. at 140 (citing Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09).
212. Id.
213. Id. Flohaug argued that none of the narrow situations outlined in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A applied to the facts of this case and that
she never undertook Jeffrey’s duty to Hannah as evidenced by her lack of contact
with Hannah. Brief of Respondents, supra note 205, at 19-20. She argued that her
assistance of other children in the day care should be irrelevant when defining her
relationship with Hannah because she did not provide any care to Hannah. Id.
214. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 139 (quoting Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d
165, 170 (Minn. 1989) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A
(1965))). In Erickson, the supreme court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 324A. Id. at 139.
215. Id. (quoting Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 170). Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 324A provides
[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another, which he should recognize as necessary for the
protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has
undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third
person upon the undertaking.
Minnesota courts have long recognized the principle that “one who assumes to
act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting
carefully . . . .” State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris, Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493
(Minn. 1996); see also Walsh v. Pagra Air Taxi, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 567, 570-71 (Minn.
1979).
216. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 139.
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Flohaug further contended that, even if she did agree to help
her mother with the day care, she did not owe a duty to Hannah
because she did not have any “affirmative interaction” with Hannah
prior to finding her not breathing on the bed, and thus she could
217
not have established a special relationship with Hannah.
The
court of appeals also rejected this argument, reasoning that
[i]t is true that an affirmative rejection of entrustment
prevents a duty of care from arising as to specific
individuals. See Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d at 708-09. But
Flohaug’s argument that affirmative interaction is
required—in addition to a general acceptance of
entrustment as to the day care—to trigger a special
relationship between herself and Hannah is without legal
218
support.
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that, as in Erickson,
Flohaug’s interaction with certain children in the day care did not
define the scope of her special relationship because she had
generally accepted the entrustment of all of the children in the day
219
care facility. “On the day of Hannah’s death, Flohaug performed
various tasks, including administering first aid to the toddler who
cut her head. The record is clear she did not withhold care from
any particular child or refuse to perform any necessary task as to
220
any children.” The court of appeals therefore ruled that Flohaug
did have a special relationship with Hannah because she
“voluntarily accepted the custody and control of a group of
221
vulnerable individuals—including Hannah . . . .”
B. Second Factor: Foreseeability of Risk Involved
The court of appeals next considered whether the second
factor regarding the foreseeability of the risk of harm to Hannah
222
“In
could be decided as a matter of law by the courts.
determining whether a danger of injury is foreseeable, courts must
consider whether it is objectively reasonable to expect that the
specific danger will result in injury, not simply whether it was within

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
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223

the realm of any conceivable possibility.”
The courts are unable
to resolve this issue as a matter of law when the issue is a close
224
case.
Laska argued it was objectively foreseeable that harm or injury
225
to Hannah could occur if Flohaug did not supervise Hannah.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Austin v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. that when a court is determining whether a risk of
harm is foreseeable, the court must consider the harm that one
should anticipate and not merely the harm that actually
226
occurred. Laska argued that Flohaug did not need to foresee the
particular injury that occurred to Hannah, only that it could be
anticipated that an injury would likely result from Flohaug’s
227
negligent act or failure to act.
Laska relied on Andrade, the
numerous protections the legislature has provided for infants in
day cares, and Flohaug’s knowledge that children had previously
been injured in Jeffrey’s day care, to support her contention that
the risk of harm to Hannah was foreseeable to Flohaug when
Flohaug left Hannah unsupervised for hours in an overcrowded
228
day care.
223. Id. (citing Whiteford by Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A, 582
N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn. 1998)). The district court found that Flohaug did not
foresee the risk of harm of Hannah’s sleeping on an adult bed until she found
Hannah not breathing on the bed. See Order and Memorandum, supra note 4.
224. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 140.
225. See Brief of Respondents, supra note 205, at 21.
226. Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136, 138
(1967).
227. Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 137-38 (citing Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d
398, 401 (Minn. 1995)).
228. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 25 (citing Andrade v. Ellefson, 391
N.W.2d 836, 844 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing that when a day care is overcrowded
with very young children, “such overcrowding is per se dangerous”) (Wahl, J.,
concurring)). The State of Minnesota has promulgated regulations for the
purpose of protecting vulnerable infants in licensed day care facilities, including
requiring caregivers to provide constant supervision of infants. See MINN. R.
9502.0325, subp. 1 (2003). Minnesota Rule 9502.0315, subpart 29a, requires a
caregiver to be “within sight or hearing of an infant, toddler, or preschooler at all
times so that the caregiver is capable of intervening to protect the health and
safety of the child.” In contrast, the legislature requires less supervision of older
children: “For the school age child, [supervision] means a caregiver being
available for assistance and care so that the child’s health and safety is protected.”
MINN. R. 9502.0315, subp. 29a. Laska asked that the court determine if these
regulations showed that the risk of harm to Hannah was objectively foreseeable to
Flohaug if she left Hannah unsupervised for hours. Appellant’s Brief, supra note
152, at 11; see also Kuhl v. Heinen, 672 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003)
(recognizing that knowledge of the danger meets the foreseeability requirement).
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Flohaug argued she did not foresee any danger in Hannah
sleeping on her stomach on an adult bed because she had not
229
received any training on SIDS risk factors.
She further
contended she did not know that Jeffrey’s day care was
overcrowded because she did not know it was overcapacity on
230
August 21.
The court of appeals determined that because of the
meritorious arguments of both parties, the issue of foreseeability
was not so clear that the court could decide the issue as a matter of
231
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court of appeals’ ruling in Laska closely followed the
precedents established by the prior rulings of the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Public policy
and the prior case law strongly support Laska’s arguments and the
court of appeals’ ruling that there was a special relationship
between Flohaug and Hannah resulting in a duty of care being
232
owed to Hannah.
The purpose behind the legislature’s
regulation of licensed day care facilities is to ensure the safety and
233
well-being of children in day care.
Laska successfully argued to
the court that parents should be able to entrust the care of their
children to day care facilities and know that their children will be
234
safe and properly cared for. Though Minnesota appellate courts
rarely find cases in which they will impose a duty to protect, the
compelling facts in this case dictated that such a duty must be
found.
The Laska ruling will not result in a duty being owed by all
persons and family members who live in licensed day care facilities,
as Flohaug argued at the court of appeals. Instead, the ruling
simply affirms previously established law regarding the duty that
arises when a defendant has custody and control of a vulnerable
person who lacks the ability for self-protection, and the defendant
voluntarily agrees to assume a duty of care for that vulnerable
person. The court of appeals’ decision upholds the public’s
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Brief of Respondents, supra note 205, at 14.
Id.
Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 141.
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 152, at 27.
Id. (citing MINN. R. 9502.0325, subp.1).
Laska, 696 N.W.2d at 141.
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expectation that a person who agrees to provide care to children in
a day care is liable for her failure to exercise reasonable care when
caring for those children.
Following Hannah’s death, her parents have fought an uphill
battle to obtain justice for their daughter and to ensure that her
death results in legal changes that ensure the protection of other
vulnerable children in day care facilities throughout the State of
235
Minnesota. Through her battle in the courts, Laska’s tragedy has
captured media attention that has resulted in legislative change.
On Sunday, April 24, 2005, Laska’s tragedy was outlined in a frontpage story in the Star Tribune newspaper as part of a story about
236
safety issues surrounding Minnesota’s licensed day care facilities.
Laska stated that “[w]e brought this lawsuit . . . for justice for
Hannah . . . [a]nd in hopes we can prevent this from happening to
237
someone else’s family.”
This newspaper story brought to the
forefront issues facing parents who expect their children to be
monitored, supervised, and safe in day cares that are licensed by
the government. As stated on the Star Tribune editorial page:
Minnesotans go about life assuming that their state is
235. There was a second appeal in Laska after the district court granted a
motion for summary judgment to the defendants Anoka County and the licensing
worker who inspected Jeffrey’s day care facility prior to Hannah’s death, citing
Jeffrey for numerous rule violations, including sleeping Hannah on an adult bed
instead of in an approved crib. The district court ruled as a matter of law that,
because Anoka County could not have shut down Jeffrey’s day care in time to
prevent Hannah’s death, Laska could not prove that the county caused Hannah’s
death. See Laska v. Anoka County, No. A05-315, 2005 WL 3470036, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005), rev. denied, (Minn. Mar. 14, 2006). Laska argued on
appeal that there were facts in dispute; namely, whether monitoring of the day
care by the county would have deterred the ongoing rule violations and that this
precluded summary judgment on the issue of causation. Id. The court of appeals
agreed and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
county and the licensing worker and remanded the case for trial. Id. at *8. In the
second appeal, Jeffrey also challenged the district court’s denial of her motion for
summary judgment when she argued that the opinion of Laska’s medical expert
was not admissible because there was no known organic cause of SIDS and it is not
generally accepted that the risk factors of sleeping infants on their stomachs on
soft surfaces like adult beds can be said to be the “cause” of a SIDS death. Id. at
*6. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling that the testimony of
Laska’s medical expert regarding SIDS risk factors is admissible. Id. Jeffrey
thereafter petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review, but this petition
was denied. Order, Laska v. Anoka County, No. A05-315, 2005 WL 3470036
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005).
236. Jean Hopfensperger, Star Tribune Special Report Examining Daycare: Child
Care, How Safe?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 24, 2005, at 1A.
237. Id.
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safer, cleaner and more regulated than most places. So
for many it came as a shock to open last Sunday’s paper
and read a special report on child care which disclosed
that in Minnesota a day-care center can remain open even
after 73 license violations, that an adult can open a daycare operation without knowing even the most basic
hazards of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and that the
state requires less training to open a home day-care
business than to become a manicurist. . . .
[I]t is plain from Sunday’s report that Minnesota now
lags behind many of its neighbors.
This state of affairs is especially galling in Minnesota.
The state regularly leads the nation in the proportion of
working mothers, with nearly three out of four mothers of
preschoolers holding jobs outside the home. These
women make a huge contribution to the state’s economy,
and it’s disturbing that the state can’t guarantee that their
238
children will be safe while they are at work.
The public attention from this media coverage led the
Minnesota Legislature to pass a law in July 2005 that requires day
cares to prominently post correction orders issued by the counties
that document rule violations at day care facilities so that parents
are better informed about the quality of care their children are
239
receiving in those day care facilities.
The new law also requires
additional training for day care providers, and “the state will work
240
to post day care safety records online by early [2006].”
Legislators pushed through these changes in the law because
providing additional information to parents about licensed day
cares “is critical” based on this state having “one of the highest rates
241
of working mothers in the nation.”
The Laska ruling supports this state’s sound public policy of
establishing laws that will increase the safety of infants and young
children in licensed day care facilities.

238. Editorial, Child Care Quality: Gaps in the Minnesota System, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Apr. 27, 2005, at 16A.
239. See Jean Hopfensperger, Change for Child Care: New Laws Aim to Enhance
Safety by Beefing up Licensing Rules in State, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jul. 15,
2005, at 1A; Editorial, supra note 238, at 16A; see also Omnibus Health and Human
Services Finance Bill, ch. 4, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law, 1st Spec. Sess.
240. See Hopfensperger, supra note 236.
241. Id.
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